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Summary of stakeholders' submissions on Mali*

Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

I. Background

1. The present report was prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and 16/21, taking into consideration the periodicity of the universal periodic review. It is a summary of 16 stakeholders' submissions[1] to the universal periodic review, presented in a summarized manner owing to word-limit constraints.

II. Information provided by stakeholders

A. Scope of international obligations[2] and cooperation with international human rights mechanisms and bodies[3]

2. JS3 was concerned at the inordinate backlog in reports from Mali to treaty bodies.[4]

B. National human rights framework[5]

3. JS5 noted that, despite its establishment by law in 2016, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) still has status B.[6] JS3 and JS5 recommended developing a strategic plan and allocate the necessary resources in order to ensure that the Commission fully comply with the Paris Principles.[7]

4. JS5 indicated that in 2016, the Council of Ministers adopted the National Human Rights Policy 2017-2021.[8]

5. HRW noted that during the previous UPR cycle, Mali accepted to provide human rights training to law enforcement officials and judges, and that there had been considerable progress in this area.[9]

* The present document was not edited before being sent to United Nations translation services.

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C. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

1. Cross-cutting issues

Equality and non-discrimination[10]

6. JS2 regretted the persistence of discrimination against women and of gender-based violence, owing in particular to the delay in adopting certain legislative amendments and to the enduring sway of traditional practices and the powerful religious lobby.[11]

7. JS2 was concerned at the discriminatory provisions still to be found in the Personal and Family Code, the reform of which had failed in 2011. The legal marriageable age in Mali was 16 for girls and 18 for boys, and a woman must "obey and submit to her husband". Provisions relating to inheritance also remained discriminatory. The spread of Salafism and the imposition of Sharia law in certain parts of the country by a number of jihadist groups were also of particular concern.[12]

8. AI recommended to eliminate all discriminatory provisions and practices against women and girls contained in the Persons and Family Code; and raise the minimum age of marriage for girls to 18 years of age.[13]

Development, the environment, and business and human rights[14]

9. JS6 deplored the use by one company, M3, of various pesticides on fields around the villages of Sanamadougou and Saou, polluting the water, the soil and the environment in general, and giving rise to health problems.[15] JS6 recommended taking steps to protect customary land rights and ensuring that communities were properly involved in decision-making processes that affected them.[16]

Human rights and counter-terrorism[17]

10. HRW indicated that the security forces responded to attacks by Islamist armed groups with counterterrorism operations that often resulted in arbitrary arrests, summary executions, torture, and other ill-treatment. The vast majority of human rights violations had been committed by the army during interrogations in the first two days after detention.[18]

11. Amnesty International (AI) remained concerned about law against terrorism which allows for the death penalty for terrorist offences.[19] AI regretted that the law allowed for police searches at any time and without the presence of the suspect, and at the lack of clarity on police custody extension.[20] AI recommended ensuring that all those arrested or detained on suspicion of terrorist acts have immediate and unrestricted access to legal counsel.[21]

12. In April 2007, AI interviewed detainees in Bamako Central Prison, charged for terrorist acts, who, since 2013 had not been allowed to exercise outside the prison cells, which are cramped and poorly ventilated.[22] AI was also informed of deaths in custody of people suspected of being members of armed groups.[23]

2. Civil and political rights

Right to life, liberty and security of person[24]

13. AI noted that the bill for the abolition of death penalty had been repeatedly postponed and the courts continue to impose death sentences. AI and JS3 recommended once again to abolish the death penalty for all crimes, pending its total abolition; commute all death sentences; and ratify without reservations the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.[25]

14. ADPEN recalled that Mali had experienced a major crisis in 2012. The armed conflict triggered by an independence movement had quickly become associated with the advance of Islamist movements wishing to impose Sharia law in the region.[26] In 2013, with

international assistance, the towns captured by Islamists had gradually been retaken by the central Government.[27]

15. AI, ADPEN, ICB, AI and JS2[28] were concerned at the fact that numerous civilians had been killed since 2012, particularly in northern regions,[29] and that the crisis had had multiple negative consequences for civilian populations.[30] HRW noted that crimes committed by extremist groups included summary executions, bomb attacks, limb amputations, and the destruction of cultural and religious shrines, sexual violence, widespread pillage, and recruitment of children.[31]

16. According to JS2, hundreds of people had been arrested for reasons related to the conflict, and dozens of those had been detained, in some cases for months, without an arrest warrant or after expiry of the detention order, on no clear grounds and without having been informed of the charges against them. They had allegedly been tortured by the Malian army, in some cases resulting in death.[32]

17. HRW and AI recalled that during its previous UPR review, Mali accepted to guarantee the respect for human rights and international humanitarian law by the security forces. However, abuses including extrajudicial execution, enforced disappearance, torture, and arbitrary detention persisted.[33]

18. ICB noted in 2017 an increase of casualties and impunity. It recorded more than 200 deaths in ten weeks, many of them in the region of Mopti, where individual attacks and homicides were perpetrated against traditional and religious authorities, together with frequent ambushes to the security and armed forces.[34]

19. AI recommended carrying out investigations into all allegations of extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearance or any other crime under international law; exercise strict command control over the armed forces and hold any superior officer accountable.[35]

20. ADPEN was concerned at the resurgence of inter-ethnic conflict, and particularly at the murder of dozens of people belonging to a particular ethnic group.[36] JS2 noted human rights violations against certain communities perceived as having ties to terrorist and vigilante groups.[37]

21. ICB and ADPEN indicated that a peace agreement had been signed between the various parties in 2015. However, the implementation of this agreement had proved complicated.[38] JS2 emphasized the need to speed up implementation of the peace agreement, notably in terms of measures to disarm the armed groups, efforts to combat impunity and development measures for the affected regions.[39]

22. JS3 and HRW *recalled that* Mali accepted to implement measures to ensure that the absolute ban on torture and ill-treatment are observed by the Malian Armed Forces. However, detainees interviewed between 2013 and 2017 told HRW that they had been severely mistreated during interrogation by army soldiers.[40] HRW recommended ensuring that government gendarmes accompany the Malian army on operations at all times.[41]

23. JS3 recommended that article 209 of the Criminal Code be amended to provide for penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime of torture, to ensure that acts of torture were not subject to the statute of limitations, and to persevere with investigations into allegations of torture, prosecute the perpetrators and hand down appropriate sentences.[42]

24. JS3 recommended that NHRC be given access to all places of detention and that prison overcrowding be reduced, for example by observing the limits on pretrial detention and choosing alternative non-custodial sentences.[43]

25. JS3[44] and AI recalled that during the previous UPR, Mali sought the support of the international community to improve prison conditions.[45] However, prison conditions remained poor. In Bamako, 1200 detainees were held in the prison which has a capacity for only 400 inmates, and prisoners had to take turns to sleep due to the limited space.[46]

26. In April 2017, AI documented the cases of four prisoners held in an unofficial detention centre in Bamako known as the "Sécurité d'Etat", run by an army unit. The prison was not subject to inspection because it was not officially recognized, and lawyers and

family members had been denied access to inmates. Some of those detained are accused of carrying out terrorist acts. AI had not received a response to its request to visit detainees held at the "Sécurité d'Etat". AI and HRW recommended putting an end to arbitrary arrests and illegal detention in non-official places of detention, notably the General Directorate of State Security, and ensure that all detainees have the right to legal counsel.[47]

Administration of justice, including impunity, and the rule of law[48]

27. AI, JS2, JS3 and HRW During its 2013 UPR, Mali committed to undertake effective and impartial investigations into all reports of serious human rights violations and to ensure that perpetrators were brought to justice. However, there has been little progress in this area, especially regarding violence against women.[49]

28. The International Criminal Bar (ICB) noted that investigations of human rights violations rarely take place, and if they do, they are scarcely ever completed. This was due to a large extent to the armed conflict. ICB also noted interference on the independence and impartiality of judges, especially in cases that involve politics or certain officials.[50]

29. AI was concerned that in 2014, in the run up to the Algiers Peace Agreement, more than 40 prisoners, including high-ranking members of armed groups were released without trial. Most of them were charged with serious crimes perpetrated in the northern regions in 2012 and 2013, including rape, torture, amputations, deliberate and arbitrary killings, the use of child soldiers and terrorism.[51] ICB noted that alleged perpetrators were otherwise exchanged for western captives being held by terrorist groups.[52]

30. JS3 recommended continuing with efforts to investigate allegations of extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances, and prosecuting and sentencing the perpetrators.[53] AI recommended to open effective investigations by civilian authorities into all allegations of crimes under international law and human rights violations, and ensure prosecution in fair trials; ensure that the Bamako courts are competent to receive and investigate all cases of serious crimes under international law committed in the north of Mali in 2012 and 2013; and set up the international commission of inquiry as provided in the Algiers Peace Agreement.[54]

31. JS5 was concerned that the composition of appointed commissioners of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) was made without consultations.[55] JS5 recommended reviewing the composition of the members of the TJRC by ensuring that armed groups are not overrepresented, ensure equal gender representation, and give the necessary resources to guarantee the effective functioning of the Commission.[56] HRW recommended that the TJRC make recommendations aimed at ensuring better governance and preventing a repetition of past violations.[57]

32. AI and JS2 were concerned at the fact that, in 2012 and 2013, the Supreme Court had transferred jurisdiction for the "occupied areas" to the *tribunal de grande instance* (court of major jurisdiction) of Bamako District commune 3.[58] However, in February 2015, at the request of the Malian Government, the Supreme Court had restored jurisdiction to the northern courts,[59] even though the courts in the northern regions were not able to try sensitive cases, mainly owing to the security situation, threats to judges and the lack of a State presence in the region.[60]

33. AI and JS2 indicated that all ongoing proceedings were still at the investigation stage. The case against former coup leader Amadou Haya Sanogo and his co-defendants was the only one to have reached trial, in 2016.[61] However, it had since been postponed.[62]

34. JS2 indicated that complaints of war crimes and crimes against humanity had been brought by its member organizations between 2014 and 2015 on behalf of over 100 victims of sexual violence, although the investigations had stalled.[63]

35. HRW welcomed the fact that, in September 2016, the ICC sentenced Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi to nine years in prison for his role in destroying historical and religious monuments in Timbuktu in 2012, and that ICC investigations in Mali are ongoing. HRW recommended establishing a special investigation cell to investigate grave crimes committed by all sides during and since the 2012-2013 armed conflict, and continue full cooperation with the International Criminal Court.[64]

36. JS2 was concerned at the draft constitutional amendment reinforcing the President's powers.[65] JS5 stated that, due to the mounting pressure from civil society organisations, the referendum was postponed.[66]

37. JS3 deplored the fact that corruption remained a fact of life in Mali, and that many highly placed and influential people enjoyed impunity. JS3[67] and HRW recommended establishing an anti-corruption body empowered to investigate and recommend prosecution of public officials implicated in corrupt practices; publish the national budget and inform on government revenues and expenditures.[68]

Fundamental freedoms and the right to participate in public and political life[69]

38. AI recalled that Mali accepted a recommendation to protect freedom of expression.[70] AI welcomed the establishment of the High Authority of Communication (HAC), in 2014.[71] AI was however concerned that bloggers had been arrested and charged with affront to public decency and demotivating troops,[72] and journalist sentenced to imprisonment for defamation.[73]

39. Free Press Unlimited noted that the crisis led to a serious deterioration of press freedom in the country. Northern Mali continued to be a dangerous area for journalists, who have been kidnapped, killed and disappeared.[74] JS5 recommended protecting fundamental human rights and ensuring safety for journalists and refraining from criminalizing their legitimate activities.[75] JS6 recommended putting an end to all forms of criminalization of human rights defenders, including those fighting for land rights.[76]

40. FPU and Access Now regretted that, according to various reports, the shutdown of certain social media applications on the mobile internet was ordered in June 2017, during the street protests against the referendum on the constitutional reform project.[77] Access Now recommended to refrain from slowing, blocking, or shutting down internet and telecommunications services, particularly during elections and public assemblies.[78]

41. JS5 and AI noted that Mali adopted a draft bill granting a number of rights to human rights defenders.[79] However, they were concerned that during demonstrations, people had been shot dead or wounded.[80]

42. JS5 and AI recommended ensuring that the draft law is in line with international law, provides a protection mechanism for human rights defenders, and clearly defining their rights and responsibilities.[81]

Prohibition of all forms of slavery[82]

43. JS2 was concerned at the fact that slavery and slavery-like practices existed in Mali, and that it was difficult to determine the extent of the problem as it remained a taboo subject. However, these practices continued, particularly in the north of the country. JS2 recommended that a special law be adopted to define and punish offences relating to slavery.[83]

44. NHRC reported that, owing to its geographic location in the Sahel, Mali had a problem of trafficking in persons, particularly women. There was no specialized institutional mechanism to help women victims of trafficking or sexual exploitation.[84]

3. Economic, social and cultural rights

Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work

45. JS1 recommended that public programmes be created to help marginalized young people to find employment.[85]

46. HRW recalled that Mali accepted to "combat effectively the child labour and trafficking of children." However thousands of children continue to work in artisanal and small-scale gold mines in highly dangerous conditions. HRW recommended improving child labor monitoring, including in artisanal and small-scale gold mines; and enforcing the legal ban on hazardous child labor.[86]

Right to social security

47. JS2 deplored the increasing number of people suffering from food insecurity and the fact that several million people received no State support.[87]

Right to an adequate standard of living[88]

48. JS2 was concerned at the fact that, in the face of the rise in levels of violence since 2015, the State had withdrawn from some areas of Mali, with drastic consequences, leaving the population deprived of the most basic services.[89]

49. Cultural Survival was concerned that approximately 2 million people were food insecure, and over 54 000 people did not had adequate access to clean drinking water.[90]

50. JS6 was concerned that, following the expropriation decision,[91] and as a result of the operations of the *Moulin Moderne du Mali* (M3) company, the residents of Sanamadougou and Saou no longer had full access to their land, and therefore lacked food security.[92] Their access to decent housing[93] and water was also restricted. Furthermore, one of the pumps providing the village of Sanamadougou with drinking water had broken down and the residents did not have the funds to repair it. The situation also affected cattle breeders in the region.[94] JS6 recommended speeding up the handling of complaints related to land disputes through the interministerial commission established in 2012.[95]

Right to health[96]

51. JS2: Despite some progress on the legislative front, numerous challenges remained in the health sector, such as social conflicts that had led to lengthy strikes, while insecurity around the country had also led to the discontinuation of health-care services and the refusal of some health-care workers to work in conflict zones.[97]

52. ADF International recommended improving health care infrastructure, access to emergency obstetric care, midwifing training, and resources devoted to maternal health.[98]

53. HRW noted that, since 2013, on at least 12 occasions, ambulances and vehicles used by both the Malian government and aid organizations to deliver health care were attacked or robbed. In some, sick passengers and health workers were forced out of the vehicles. HRW recommended to provide regular and adequate patrols to protect civilians and humanitarian workers in areas at particular risk from violent crime and banditry.[99]

Right to education[100]

54. JS2 indicated that the conflict in Mali had seriously affected the education system, most particularly in the northern regions, where in some places schools had been closed for over two years owing to insecurity and the children's vulnerability to the fundamentalists, who had attempted to impose Qur'anic education.[101]

55. CS, CADH, AI and JS2 noted with concern that more than 500 schools had been closed in regions affected by the crisis, and more than 150,000 children are out of school due to lack of security. Despite the Algiers Peace Agreement, armed groups still occupy some schools. In addition, in some districts, people representing themselves as jihadists have threatened staff at schools, demanding that the schools are closed or converted to madrassas or koranic teaching. [102] AI recommended implementing the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict; and taking measures, including in collaboration with MINUSMA, to prevent the occupation of schools by armed groups.[103] NHRC recommended introducing a system of hazard pay for affected teachers in conflict zones.[104]

56. According to JS2, considerable progress had been made in girls' education. However, many students had not been able to access quality education owing in part to the gradual withdrawal of the State in favour of the private sector. JS6 expressed similar concerns.[105]

57. ADPEN noted that access to education for the children of nomadic groups was virtually non-existent, on the one hand because of the failure to register births, and on the other because of the nomadic lifestyle, which made it difficult to monitor children's

enrolment.[106] ADPEN recommended establishing a mobile school system that could move around with the nomadic populations in the north of Mali, and ensuring the registration of births in order to facilitate access to education.[107]

4. Rights of specific persons or groups

Women[108]

58. JS2 was concerned at the extent of violence against women in the context of the armed conflict. JS2 indicated that, in the first quarter of 2017, the gender-based violence cluster had recorded a total of 790 instances of gender-based violence, and many places had no specialized victim care service.[109] JS2 deplored the fact that sexual violence was under-documented.[110]

59. JS2 welcomed the creation of the National Action Committee on the Eradication of Practices Harmful to Women's and Children's Health and the National Programme to Combat the Practice of Female Genital Mutilation, as well as the awareness-raising activities that had prompted 1,088 of the 12,000 villages in Mali to announce that they would no longer practice female genital mutilation. However, JS2 was concerned at the fact that female genital mutilation was still carried out in Mali. The Human Rights Action Consortium (CADH) added that one demographic survey had found that 91 per cent of women aged 15 to 45 had been subjected to female genital mutilation. According to JS2, early female genital mutilation was increasingly common in towns.[111] JS2 and AI recommended criminalizing the practice and persevering with the awareness-raising efforts.[112]

60. AI regretted that early and forced marriage remained a concern, with 15%[113] of women having been married under the age of 15 and 59.9% married under 18.[114]

61. While noting with satisfaction the law establishing a 30 per cent quota for women in political and administrative positions,[115] JS2 found it regrettable that women's participation in political and institutional life remained marginal.[116]

Children[117]

62. HRW recalled that, in 2013 Mali committed to take measures to protect children from recruitment by armed groups. However, while welcoming the protocol to ensure child combatants were promptly handed over to humanitarian actors, HRW was concerned that armed groups, including the self-defense militia GATIA, continued to recruit child soldiers.[118]

63. AI was concerned that several child soldiers had been arrested by the Malian authorities and held in detention, without adequate protection measures for children in custody.[119]

64. HRW and AI recommended taking measures to prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers; ensure that all children arrested on suspicion of association with armed groups receive special attention and set up a programme to facilitate their rehabilitation in their community and families.[120]

65. JS1 added that, although there was a fairly substantial legal framework for child protection, it was not very effective,[121] and the problem of children and young people living on the street continued to grow.[122] According to one study, 75 per cent of children and young people on the street were talibes whose only means of subsistence was begging.[123] Living on the streets, these children were victims of social exclusion and exposed to substance abuse, physical and sexual violence, and psychological trauma on a daily basis.[124] JS1 recommended carrying out preventive action,[125] supporting the socioeconomic reintegration of children and young people living on the streets,[126] and setting up services specifically to deal with addiction.[127]

66. JS4 recommended capacity-building, for those working in the justice system, in the use of alternative mechanisms, including mediation, as a means of dealing with children in conflict with the law without resorting to legal proceedings;[128] guaranteeing the presence of a lawyer during preliminary enquiries in order to safeguard the best interests of the child;[129]

operationalizing children's sections in police stations;[129] establishing a mechanism to allow children deprived of their liberty to report any ill-treatment they might suffer, without fear of reprisals.[130]

67. GIEACPC was concerned that corporal punishment was still lawful in the home and in alternative care. It recommended Mali to clearly prohibit all corporal punishment of children in every setting.[131]

Persons with disabilities

68. JS2 recommended continuing the process of strengthening the legal framework for the protection of persons with disabilities, and taking genuine measures to support them.[132]

Migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons

69. Cultural Survival was concerned at the difficult situation for refugees. In addition to limited access to healthcare, clean water, and education, refugees also face physical and sexual within the refugee camps and violence, and stigmatization. Cultural Survival noted that returning refugees were in need of assistance to be reiterated.[133]

70. Cultural Survival and CADH noted that internally displaced persons were particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation.[134]

[illegible]

[illegible] The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org

Civil society

Individual submissions:

AI	Amnesty International, London (United Kingdom);
HRW	Human Rights Watch;
CS	Cultural Survival;
CADH	Consortium Actions Droits Humains;
ADPEN	Association pour le développement et la protection de l'environnement au Nord Mali;
FPU	Free Press Unlimited;
GIEACPC	Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children;
ICH	International Criminal Bar.

Joint submissions:

JS1	**Joint submission 1 submitted by**: Samusocial Mali, Caritas Mali, and Apprentis d'Auteuil;
JS2	**Joint submission 2 submitted by**: l'Association Malienne des Droits de l'Homme (AMDH), l'Association pour le Progrès et la Défense des Droits des Femmes (APDF), Femmes & Droits Humains (F&DH), Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF), l'Association des Juristes Maliennes (AJM), le Collectif Cri de Coeur, appuyés par la Fédération Internationale des ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH); a été établi pour contribuer au 3eme cycle de l'Examen Périodique Universel (EPU) du Mali;
JS3	**Joint submission 3 submitted by**: Association chrétienne contre la Torture (ACAT) and Federation Internationale de l'ACAT (FIACAT);
JS4	**Joint Submission 4 submitted by**: Bureau International Catholique de l'enfance, Bureau national catholique de l'enfance;
JS5	**Joint submission 5 submitted by**: Femmes, droits humains, International service for human rights, COMADDH;
JS6	**Joint submission 6 submitted by**: Convergence Malienne contre les Accaparements des Terres, Association des organisations professionnelles paysannes, CAD Mali, Coordination nationale des organisations paysannes.

Ligue pour la Justice et le développement des droits de l'homme

[1] The following abbreviations are used in UPR documents:

ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
OP-ICESCR	Optional Protocol to ICESCR
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
ICCPR-OP 1	Optional Protocol to ICCPR.
ICCPR-OP 2	Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
OP-CEDAW	Optional Protocol to CEDAW
CAT	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
OP-CAT	Optional Protocol to CAT
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
OP-CRC-AC	Optional Protocol to CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict
OP-CRC-SC	Optional Protocol to CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography
OP-CRC-IC	Optional Protocol to CRC on a communications procedure
ICRMW	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
OP-CRPD	Optional Protocol to CRPD
ICPPED	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

[2] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/21/16, paras. 124.1-124.18, 124.55, 124.57.

[3] JS3 para. 31

[4] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/21/16, paras. 111.1, 111.4,111.9, 111.10,111.11, 111.9.

[5] JS5 page 2.

[6] JS3 para. 29 and JS5 page 3.

[7] JS5, page 2 (f-).

[8] HRW page 2.

[9] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/21/16, paras. 111.13, 111.14, 111.17, 111.1.

[10] JS2 page 2 (iii)

[11] JS2 page 3

[12] AI page 7

[13] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/21/16, paras.

[14] JS6 page 7.

[15] JS6 page 13.

[16] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/21/16, para. 111.11.

[17] HRW page 3.

[18] AI page 5

[19] AI page 2.

[20] AI page 7.

[21] AI page 4.

[22] AI page 4.

[23] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/21/16, paras. 111.17,111.21,111.23-111.24, 111.44, 111.81, 111.85, 112.1, 112.11, 112.13.

[24] AI page 7, and JS3 para. 3.

[25] AHRSN, para. 1.1

[26] AHRSN, para. 2.

[27] AI JS2 pages 3 and 4.

[28] AHRSN 14 et 15.

[29] AI pages 5 and 6. AHRSN para. 4 and IUM pages 1 and 7.

[30] HRW page 3.

[31] JS2 page 5.

[32] HRW page 1 and AI page 5.

[33] IUM page 3.

[34] AI page 6.

[1] A/HRC/WG.6/29/MLI/1, para. 19.
[2] JS2, page 4.
[3] A/HRC/WG.6/29/MLI/1, para. 3.
[4] JS2 page 4.
[5] HRW page 2.
[6] HRW page 3; JS3, para. 9. Recommandations par le Canada, la Norvège, l'Irlande, l'Espagne, l'Australie, la Saint Naïge et le Costa Rica dans le rapport du groupe de travail sur l'EPU: A/HRC/23/6, para. 111.19, 111.21, 111.23, 111.91, 111.62, 112.14 et 112.26.
[7] JS3, para. 12.
[8] JS3 para. 20.
[9] JS3 paras. 15-20; AI pages 4 and 5.
[10] Summary of the proceedings of the stevens process; A. Presentation by the State under review, paragraph 17.
[11] Recommandations par la France dans le rapport du groupe de travail sur l'EPU: A/HRC/23/6, para. 111.24.
[12] AI page 7 and HRW page 3.
[13] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/23/16, paras 111.2-111.117, 111.49-111.97, 111.61-111.67, 112.14, 112.23-112.27.
[14] HRW page 2; AI pages 3 and 4; JS2 page 8; JS3, para. 8 Recommandations par la Lituanie, la Pologne, l'Australie, la Saint Naïge, le Canada et le Costa Rica dans le rapport du groupe de travail sur l'EPU: A/HRC/23/6, paras. 111.88, 111.90, 111.62, 112.25 et 112.26.
[15] ACSH, pages 3 and 4.
[16] AI pages 3 and 4.
[17] ACSH page 4.
[18] JS3 para. 8.
[19] AI page 7.
[20] JS3, page 2 (II).
[21] JS3, page 3.
[22] HRW page 7.
[23] Arrêt de la Cour Suprême N° 49 du 16 juillet 2012 – Arrêt de la Cour Suprême N° 04 du 21 janvier 2013.
[24] JS2 page 7 and AI page 3.
[25] JS2 page 7.
[26] Voir Communiqué de presse FIDH-AMDH1 « Ouverture du procès d'Amadou Haya Sanogo au Mali un pas crucial dans la lutte contre l'impunité ». 28 novembre 2016.
[27] Voir Communiqué de presse FIDH-AMDH1 « Ouverture à début 2017 du procès d'Amadou Haya Sanogo: les autorités maliennes doivent tenir leurs engagements ». 14 décembre 2016, disponible à: https://www.fidh.org/fr/regions/afrique/mali/ouverture-a-debut-2017-du-proces-d-amadou-haya-sanogo-les-autorites
[28] Voir le rapport FIDH-AMDH1 « Mali: Terrorisme et impunité font chanceler un accord de paix fragile ». 11 mai 2017, Section IV, pages 13 à 19.
[29] HRW page 3.
[30] JS2 page 2.
[31] JS3, page 2 (I).
[32] JS3 para. 27.
[33] HRW page 7.
[34] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/23/16, paras. 111.65-111.66(i).
[35] A/HRC/23/6, Accepted Recommendations: 111.67 (State of Palestine); 111.68 (Spain).
[36] AI page 1 and 2.
[37] AI page 1 and 2.
[38] AI page 1 and 2.
[39] EPU, page 1 and 3.
[40] JS5 page 3.
[41] JS6 page 12.
[42] EPU, page 2 and Annex Note, para. 12.
[43] Annex Note, para. 23.
[44] JS5, pages 2 (I) and 3 and AI pages 2 and 3.
[45] AI page 1 and 2.
[46] AI page 4.
[47] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/23/16, paras. 111.35, 111.38.
[48] JS2 page 10.
[49] CAT/C/MLI/1 para. 13.
[50] JS5, para. 14.2.

[1] HRW, page 7.
[2] JS2, page 11.
[3] See relevant recommendations see A/HRC/23/16, paras. 111.72-111.74, 111.77.
[4] JS2, pages 11 and 12.
[5] UN, page 7.
[6] JS4, page 8.
[7] JS4, page 7.
[8] JS4, page 5-6.
[9] JS4, page 7.
[10] JS4, page 12.
[11] See relevant recommendations see A/HRC/23/16, paras. 111.75, 111.77.
[12] JS2, page 11.
[13] AIAD International, para. 29- 41.
[14] HRW, page 4.
[15] See relevant recommendations see A/HRC/23/16, paras.111.75, 111.77.
[16] JS2, page 12.
[17] JS3, para. 11.2.4 UN page 5 L'ADEJOR, AI page 7.
[18] AI page 7.
[19] A/HRC/29.
[20] JS4, page 8.
[21] ADPS/L, para. 7.
[22] ADPS/L, para. 9.
[23] See relevant recommendations see A/HRC/23/16, paras. 111.13-111.16, 112.25-111.32, 111.48, 111.94, 111.70, 111.73, 112.6, 112.7, 112.19, 112.20, 113.1.
[24] JS2 page 9.
[25] JS2 page 9.
[26] A/HRC/WG.6/29/MLI/3, para. 8.
[27] JS2 page 9 and AI page 7.
[28] The State of the World's Children 2016 : A fair chance for every child', UNICEF, June 2016.
[29] Loi du 12 novembre 2019.
[30] JS2 page 10.
[31] See relevant recommendations see A/HRC/23/16, paras.111.33-111.36, 111.39-111.42, 112.23.
[32] HRW, UN page 5.
[33] AI, page 2.
[34] AI page 8 and HRW page 5.
[35] JS1 para. 16.
[36] JS1 para. 4.6.
[37] JS1 para. 9.
[38] JS1 para. 10.
[39] JS2, para. 15.4.
[40] JS3, para. 14.1.
[41] JS3, para. 19.1.
[42] JS4, paras. 9.1 and 14.1.
[43] JS4 paras. 14.4 and 20.1.
[44] JS4, para. 27.2.
[45] JS4 paras. 33.2 and 40.2.
[46] GIE/SC/PS, paras 2.
[47] JS2 page 11.
[48] UN pages 4 and 5.
[49] UN page 6 A/HRC/WG.6/29/MLI/3 para. 29.